system will not be disrupted by the failure of one bank or even by the failur'e of sever'al banks. The goverrlment policies that cr'eaie tilis public confidence in tile stability of tile banking system reflect the ilistory of each natioil. This paper' contrasts the experience with banking panics in the United Kingdom to that ill the United States,
The last banking panic in the t,Jnited Kingdom occurred iri 1866. At that time the Bank of England acted to prevent the disruption of the banking system when banks failed and the public in England came to believe that tile Bank of England had accepted that responsibility and would he successful in car'rvirig it out.
The United States established a central bank ill 1914, but tile Federal Reserve System failed to pr-event bankirlg panics in the early 1930s. 'i'hus, the public in tile United States did not have the experience of observing a central bank successfully dealing with barlking panics. The last banking panic in the United States 119331 occui'red iii the same year when the federal gover'nnieni established deposit insurarlce. 'this observation irldicates that federal cieposit insur'ance has been an important feature of the policies iii the United States for' preventing banking panics.
Two features of the oper'ation of commercial barlks make the banking system vulnerable to disruptions when depositor's lose confidence in their banks. F'irst,
Coping with Bank Failures: Some Lessons from the United States and the United Kingdom
•FEOERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST LOUiS a large pai't of the liabilities of banks is payable to dlepositol's Oil demand, Second, the cas Ii reserves of banks are a small fraction of their deposit liabilities, Thus, if large numbers of depositor's suddenll W~uitedl to corivert their deposits to curr'ency, the banking s~'stemwould not immediaiclv have enough cash on hand to honor' their demands. Wllen a banlkillg pitilic occur's, people at tempt to he anno rig the Ii 'st to convent their deposits to cui'rencv because t 11ev remember that clurng previous banking panics, only those who denlanded currency ear'ly erlougil were able to get itT 's.i.~nno;n•.e t]/Jët.~1sriJĨ IOnATIIS5 .P~SUUCS Deposits and reserves of the banking system decline one-for-one as depositors withdraw currency. II total reserves were just equal to required resert'es before the withdrawals of curreilcy, i'eserves would he cleficient after the withdrawals. Each bank respotlds to its reserve shortage by selling assets, producing a decline in deinand deposits that exceeds the initial conversion of demand deposits to currency.
The vulnerability of tile banking system to panics is illustrated iii tables 1 amid 2 by the use of balance sheets. Table I presents the hypothetical balance sheet of an individual bank tilat is required by some regulatory author'ity to keep a cash reserve of at least 10 percent of total deposits. Because of concern about the viability of the bank, customer's withdraw 510 million in the form of currency, reducing the bank's cash reserves to zero. '10 raise cash reserves, the bank sells $9 million of its interest-ean'ning assets.'
When the bank sells its assets to in crease its cash reserves, however', it draws cash from other banks, causing their' i'eserves arid deposits to dechne. 'these banks must ri~iwsell some of tileir assets to eliminate their reserve deficiencies. Thus, the initial withdr'awai ofcurrency by depositor's produces a cilain reaction of reductions in deposits payable on demand.
The etTects (in the banking sv,stem of I he currency withdrawals are illustrated in table 2. Prior to the banking parlic, tile banking system has assets (if $1 .1 'Several recent studies develop theoretical models of the behavior of banks and their depositors to investigate the conditions that are likely to cause a banking panic. See Batchelor (1986) , Bryant (1980) , Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , Gorton (1985a) , Ho and Saunders (1980), and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1986) . alt many banks sell assets at the same time, the prices of bank assets may fall. In that case, the bank would have to sell additional assets and charge losses against net worth. ii,' n'rn,,',nrjnn,~r',sln nn'-,r-n~n's ''I ''~tIii,,li,nnnr Inn lii
IiI'inI n',it', I inn', -,in,iinl~,!2n'iii linr' i-.-,,'t-, ri in-r,inii~i,i~4 s\-~lnini rnl,i\ irrlnnn'r mini't nniiljnj,',nr i-it liii mirlilir' lIn,4 ',\,-ln'nri '-'i-ni nun''' LinnIIr(-nnii4 i,inliljn,nrui~~ntl,' rir'.t~~,ii-,,,t nlt~iir~it-ñi In,' hum, nil r'rjn'nennr ' lii,-tinumn,nl ir,-~s ni n'r-,nr'\i-,~~,ni,lri nut '~,in inn41-n nil Iu,tnnI~,l,junu,its.
itr'n, ',-l i',ir',nnn,.z ,rssr'l',. uI tinirlin ri l,,uiui~s 'un ,niuu,rl,r'u',rI In,mnrl~'; %1FIiTLW~iiOftT'iT~t~I rJIIFWWTf~S ames A banking panic causes a sharp redtiction in the money supply fcurrency held by the public plus bank deposits payable on deniandi. Sharp and unexpected r'eductions in the money supply usually cause reductions in economic activity arid, consequently, an iii crease in unemployment and husi less failures, The panic will end when the public becomes convi Iced that banks are safe and that it can wilhdn'aw currency from deposit accotints whenever' it wishes. At that time, the public will again deposit part of its currency with banks. in the banknng panic, sales of interest earnnng assets cause the prices ofthose assets to fail. In thms illustrabon, banks reduce their net worth by $10 billion recognrznng that loss on the sate of assets that had a value of $ 00 britron before the panrc I to~can thu failure of one iiank tic pr eculled Jr om spilling oi r into the i% hole hianlking system with such calastm oplli( consequen( es? Dilly liv r emoi in ig the fear that all banks an e iii danger ol failing. ('an this he done in practice It ( an amid the way to do it ii as dis over( ct before the th( cir~hichind the method was developed.
1 he history of the British approach to pr'eẽnting banking paiiics inõlves the history of tile Bank ol F nglarid. I lie British government ( ham t( med the Bank in 1b94 as ,i meanls of raising lunds to fight a ii ar with France. 'those subs ribimig to the stock of tll( Bank made loans to the Br itishi goi ('m'niment In r etur ml, the Bank was gi ('Ii sonic excl usix e rights to functioni as a commen cial hanlk,' Uthougli the Bank was liii' at( ly (in.n( ci, them c was alwa s a close relationship between it arld the gov( rmi rnent. Sonic aspects of the i'elationship, based on Clapham (1944 ) Fetter (1965 and Santonn (1984) DECEMBER 1SEC evolving traditions, were implicit rather' than spelled out in the Bank's charter' ou' other' legislation. lot' instance, by t lie 1 $OOs, the goven'nmen t ex pecte I the Bank to buy any pant ol its new debt issues not pun'-chased by ot lie's.
The Bank of England nlainltained a large inventory of goid upon wllich it couid draw in a panic to meet the public's denrancl for gold. Legislation in 1844 gave the Bank a mnonopoiv (in issuing hank notes and made the notes of the Batik legal tender, 'that legislation set a limit on the amount of the Bank's notes tilat could lie outstanding, thougll it specified that the limit could lie exceeded ill an emergency. The limit on the notes of the Bank could be lifted at the discm'etion of the government, Thus, the Bank of England could expand the morietamy base currency plus reservesi in an enlergency, since its notes were used as cur'rency and were field as part of bank reserves, One aspect of the policies that evolved oven' time was the Bank's i'esporlse to a banking pamc. The evolution (if that policy is ciescn'itiecl in this section by discussing first, what happened chiming two liamikinig panics that occurred in England during the 1800s arld second, why rio panics have occurn'ed in the Bn'itish banking systemii since 1866.
I mr Dece tuber 1825, a ha nki ng panic (icr Iu'u'ed in London alter' the failure of a hank Sir' Peter' Pole and (:onilpanrvf. As people lIed from rleposirs at other' banks to gold, golml reserves were claim ie I (torn lie Ran ik of l';nnglamid , 'ho (() nn rice people tI 111 t th reir hark deposits vver'e safe, the Rank lent gold fu'eeh' f,'om its hiOi(lings The panic was allayed when it became clear to the public that them'e was nothing about which to panicthat there was indeed suflicien t gold to nleet the public's increased demand l'or gold. As a m'esul t, the faiiun'e of one hank did riot tui'n into a general financial crisis, Unfortunately, however', batiking panics contintied to occur' in England after' 1825 because the Bank of England had riot macIc a putil ic con n mit men t to act as 'The actions of the Bank in the panic of 1825 are described vividly by Jeremiah Harman, director of the Bank, in Bagehot (1978) , p 73:
We tent it~gold} . . . by every possibme means and in modes we had never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased exchequer bills, we made advances on exchequer bills, we not only discounted outrighi, but we made advances on the deposit of biEls of exchange to an immense amount, in short, by every possible means consistent with the satety of the Bank and we were not on some occasions over nice. Seeing the dreadful state in which ihe public were, we rendered every assistance in our power.
a the ''iender of last resor't'' in aH tinamiciah crises, A lender of last resort acts to increase the mnonetaiy base if many people want to witlldi-aw cash (gold and notes of the Bank of Eniglandi from them' lianiks.
The significance of a lender of last resort iii a banking panic cart be illustrated b r'efer'r'inig to the balance sheets in table 2. If depositor's withdr'aw cash, the lender of last resor't acts to increase the r'eserves of (lie banking system, thus pi'eveniting the coritractioni of the money supply that could lie catised by a lianiking panic. Until the English liublic becanie (:oniyinced that the Bank of England would act to imicm'ease the niotietan' hiase lcashl in tire hands of the public plus bank r'esen'esl in financial (:rises, many (if them tetideci to withdraw cash fi'om banks when there were prolihems in the financiai system.
MSSOB 0! .'iiia
The last major banking panic icr Englanld occum'r'ed in 1866. Since then, although events have occurred that could have triggered banking crises (in 1873, 1890, 1907, 1914, 1931 and 19731, tiley did not do so.' What changed after' 1866?
The panic of 1866 hiegan with the failure of a major' English bank. Ovem'end, Gurney and Company was a large batik, four'ided early in the 19th century fn'om the amalgannation of two banks that had been important and active in the isth century. Hit by a variet of setliacks, Overend's was m:ompelled to seek assistance from the Bank of England on May 10, 1866. The Bank refused to provide assistaniceancl that afternoon Overend, Gum'ney and Company was declam'ed insolvent, The next day, them'e were runs on all banks. People scraintiled for cash because no bank was trusted! 'l'he Bank of England, which was hieing drained of notes, briefly made things worse by hesitating over' whether' to make its usual purchases of newly issued government debt. By the evening of Friday, May 11, however, the Batik gave assurance that it would provide suppom't to the banking system, and, though demands for small bills continued for a week, the panic was essentially broken in one day." The important consequence of this episode was that tile Bank had implicitly accepted 6 A succinct survey of the history of these episodes can be found in Schwartz (1986). "Panic, true panic, came with unexpected violence that day." (Ciapham, 1944) , p. 263. "Terror and anxiety took possession of men's minds for that and the whole of the succeeding day," (Bankers Magazine, 1866) . "No one knew who was sound and who was unsound." (The Economist, 1866) .°A detailed description of the faiiure of Overend, Gurney, and Company and the events surrounding that failure can be found in Batchelor (1986) . the responsibility of acting as lender' of last r'esort arid the public undem'stood that (lie Bank had accepted that responsibility. For a discussion of (lie historical development of the concept of a lender of last m'esorh, see the insert oni the oppmisite page.
/ >
The (iS. economy suffered the effects of banking panics long after' the British discovered how to prevent them, The Umiited States estatilished the F'eder'aI Besen'e as the central bank mi 1914, 'l'her'e wem'e eight tuajor hankinig panics hiefore then and additional financial crises ti'ia( had more limited r'egional impact.' '('he formation of the F'ederal Reserve, however', did not end the problem of lianking panics; the last panic occurred in 1933. The period since the last bankmr'ig panic coincides with the pem'iod of federal deposit insut'ance.
!!!n'i.ktng ! '.r.rlll War t4'~flflfl;'"
Bank Structure and Regulation -After' the Revolutionary War, the new U.S. government contined its monetary role to the nuinting of gold and silver coin. State governments assumed responsiliility for c,harten'-ing and supervising commercial hianks. State banks issued hank notes, which circulated as cum'n'ency, and had deposit liabilities against which customers could write checks. Both the hank notes amid demand deposits were payable on demand in the fornr of the coins minted by the federal government.
The first banking panic occurred in 1814 dun'ing the Wan' of 1812 with the Bmitish. In n'esponse to fear's about the outcome of the wan', many people attempted to redeem bank notes and coniven't their bank deposits into coin. The banking system n'esponded by suspending coin payments, which kept the contm'actions of the motley supply arid batik assets from being as lan-ge as they would have been (see the insert oni page 1.01. Icr all of the majon' U.S. banking panics throtigli 1907, the banking system suspended cash pa~niientsto depositom's and holders of hank notes.
The Panic of 1837 -The panic described aliove was unusual in that it was tn-iggered by anxieties about the war, Other banking panncs in this period occurred°T henine major banking panics occurred in 1814, 1837, 1857, 1861, 1873,1884,1893,1907 and 1931-33, " This section is based largely on Hammond (1963) .
The Lender of Last Resort and Walter Bagehot
he mint' ;nmiri line non'k olU aller U;rgrhnot rirtir B.rgehot c'unipbiasizecl that tine Rank ,,Iromnhii not rnrilirinmaIl~iii tInt' rltsrtnssioni oh hnamikin~arid bunk omrh~'hfl'hia\e iii this nay hnit also shoirhd annonlni'e t,ulures ' I us mnhnin prmrposal rabled loi' the Link oh in nrl~arit'etln,it ii nourbnl (hr~sin n heime~er ii et'e'4sar\ I':un 4
Itmnd to ;uuramuu'r lint ii nas n hung In mci as lie smtn' Ihis ' prrrnnmmitunmenl '' which the lhnnk had lender ni last resort anti that it n otnhd rim) sin unhesm ' linen umiade hrtorr tire episode ol' 1866 a,', 'ĩtal .\ Iatnn~b~' nheuneĩ'm' necessary. Ik~lender oh last ne-credihmhe preroiminnitmnmenl~vorbd gRe assurance sort, inn' nuraril that liii' Rank unninlil in turres tnt' Uuui srnirmnrHj,mnks notmid mint hrznlhont'dltrlaihasa panimc' henri lmei~. at hir 4 hi mterest rates, It nunnuld u',snbh nil the lailnine oh some mnther' bank, C )nce liii". lr'nci bm'eel~so tbrztt hunks m'mntmlrl satish~' liii' nit'umuamrds assitraner nasglu'ui, p~~tiu noirlci he less hikeR thrir ctrstmrnmers Finn' rash and thus aHa~'panic. II indeed liii' Rard~unigb'mi trot at'hnialI~hi,iĩ' to ,uei as noirld (10 so at prniali~hiigbi initernist 'ties to ensure hinder ol list resort .rt all: mitm'i'eR standing i'end~to tItan the Rank \vrs Ir'trl' tIre lender' ol las! u'I',sor't, do so might Jr strtlieit'mit ho prm ide stability.' banks noumhd tome ho it omnb~'nhenthe nhnie hank' ing sstem nas short olrash liii' pobic'\ ol setlmnm 4 a high lending rate na'-cir'signnr.ci ijcntbi tm) i~'e\ erit e~t'essRe numnni'tai'v e\punsiomn inn normal times und Although now tradntnonal. Hageriot S recornrrendatnoni was not accepted wmthout demur rhommison I lankey. a dnrector of the tin gtraram lee that banks repamch their bom'rn~vi ngs Bank was partmcularty crnbcal of the proposal, Afmer the O'.'ererd n hen inter'e,,t 'ales dropped alter hr paint' so that and Currneyafta:r. HankeydernnedttiattheBank Fiaoan unequnvo line iHone~stock %\as trot pei'nianerith' boosted b~catduty to lendtreely nn pannrs. Hewas concerned wmth what nas become krnowr as 'moral ha,ard It ban'~ersknow that the ci'rsrs bum run cig.
central banK wrct lend treely nn a panic. he argued. they wnll rake more chances: hoEd lower reserves make r'skner loans or pay
__________________ bnghor dnvnoonds
Bagen'on was amcnc otbrr:i".r as. i tourr';~si He bcccnmc' ndt:nr Hankey rs plainly correct 'rhe nssue however, ns whmch ns ttnẽ The U.S. economy experienced an economic boom from 1834 through 1836, suppon-ted by lam'ge investments in the United States by Europeans. Many of these large investments were in railroads arid pun'-chases of public land by those moving to the western frontier.
The boom stopped in 1837. Gold flowed fitm the Umiited States to Eun-ope as European investor's diemanded payment of their loans and liquidated their U.S. investments, This outflow of gold reduced the cash reserves of banks, which, along with failunes by business firms, caused some banks to fail. The Dry Dock Bank, a major' bank in New York City, closed on May 8, 1837. All other banks in New York City experienced runs by depositon-s the next day. 'chic New York City banks suspended coin payments on May 10, and Philadelphia banks followed suit on May 11. Within the next 10 days, banks in all the leading cities suspended coin payments.
New York City banks resimmed coin payments to holders of hank notes and deposits on May 10, 1838, exactly one year after' (lie suspension. Banks in the rest of the nation resumed coini payments between August 1838 and early 1839.
This episode illustrates the vulnerabilit of the banking system to disruption. Without a centn'al bank, the supply of cash in thie economy was determined by the coins minted by the feden'al government and international movements of pmecious metals. The bank runs following the failure of the Dry Dock Bank restrain the gr-owth of bank liabilities and to proniote greaten' public confidence in the banking system. The basic flaw in the design of the new system was the absence of a centn'al hiank with the power to incm-ease the monetary base should the public lose confidence in the value of bank deposits. Iti this period, there were major' hianking panics in 1873, 1884, 1893 and 1907, Banks acted cooperatively dum-ing these panics to imicn'ease them' resenves liy creating clearing house loan certificates f see the insert on (lie opposite pagel. 'Die creation of cleam-ing house loan certificates, however, did riot permit banks to meet the public demand for-curn'em~.During each of these panics they also suspended payments of coin and currency to depositors.
The Panic of 1907-Tine nature of banking panics in this period can be illustrated by the panic of 1907, which occurred mi October and November' of that year. This panic is interesting for seven-al m'easons. Its effects on the nonfinancial sectors of the economy were relatively severe, and its events provide a good illustration of how the loss of pulilic confidence hi one batik can lead to loss of confidence in the lianking system. Finally, political reaction to this panic led (ci the for'-nnation of the Feden-al Reserve System. F'or sever-al year's prior to 1907, gold flowed fm'om Eun-ope to the United States hiecause Eur'opeans invested heavily mi fire U.S. economy. In the fall of 1906, Suspending Cash Payments t,onnnmineu'c'ial himuiks inn tint' nnnajrnr' cnu'barn au'c'mrs inn u'esurmrred Urn' jiit\ merit cm clenuumnnci of chin Irnu' huudt he I united States snnspenrded pa,~unuents of c;rsh In 0011's antI dt'posits. depositor's and note holder's diti'i)r4 r'ac'h nit' the major' inankrng pa~~s bi'ounu tM I I thni'onnnzhi flJ07. Dur' , I lit' smgnutrr'auir'r' cit the suspension nI hnaumb~paũ ng snnspc'nnsuonms. banks in an area would agree lo , nirnmits ii the tc,r'unu of corn ou' c'Inr'n'r'umr\ r',ru inn' dlnus act together' rn u'etusnn,g mc) pa\' orut r'ash, I 'nitrl the teatc'ci h~u'c'lc'n'r nmnn~tmi table 2, lint' lnai;uru'r' sheu'i nI ISbus, the tmnn'mni of cash demanded by cic'innnsutor's the hainkunig s~'strmn '\s stnoui as bn~uuikcr's r'c'muhnzm'd dur'rng panics n'as nmetai coins, In the eau'iv 1860s that tinepnihhrm'n'asatte mptungtoconnert rts mone\ tIne easin cinnianil cinrr'nng panic's nnnc'burded cnur'r'emnc'~' irolcinings to noun rju'c'crru'emic'~tint' hn~unkeu',sas a group During these gc'uic'n'al snnspc'nlsicnuts of rash pan'nlrr'4c'd to fleet this clt'nnrzrnmti 'inn' rash, In this case nit'nits, bannks rtnnnaimied open for' business and pc'' Uu'ir' n:asir u'c'sr'nlc's n'onilci stay at .shcio million. and nutted their c'ustouunc'n's no use cieunosits tcn mnrake n'ithi that rash a~'ailahnte ri meet nvsene u'enicmnl'ej)a~'mnnents tn cjuhic'r's,(,hncr'ks~vc'r'e cleau'cci arid tic'-rniuurts, lint hnannkimng system noubci not hmRe to sell posit liabilities were tm';tmistt'n'im'ch muunnoung banks, \onm-mnssc'ts arid u'eciur'e its lumrlnibities, B scrspemndinr.i nash n'edeeuieci hank mmmc's eouitinued to c'ir'n'trbate mrs pavnients. thc' banks nonnicl pn'et'r'.ru tine contraction cur'r'enir:y~t'hernbanking pans vt'rnl' our, banks of time assets and liabilities cr1 the hankitig s~'ntcmrn showed that the public's confidence in banks could be undermined quickly when an impor'tant bank went under, At this time, however-, the U.S. banking system had no institution compan'able to the Bank of England, which had a reputation for financial strength and an inventory of cash that could cut short a panic. Cornsequently, some banking panics in the United States, like the panic of 1837, were followed by long periods of suspended cash payments. The National Banking System -Refor'ms were begun in the 1860s to achieve two pun-poses: to establish a national cun-rency, with all currency accepted at par value in exchange throughout the nation, arid to make the banking system less vulnem'ahihe to panics. As a first step, the federal goven'nnnent began char'ten-ing national banks whose notes wen'e to be the pn'imamy national currency. National banks were n'equim'ed to hold hioth collater'al with the Treasury Depan'tmenit against them-notes as well as cash nesenves that were a percentage of their deposit liabilities and niotes,.'l'lie collateral arid reserve r-equirements wen'e imposed to "This section is based largely on Cagan (1963), Robertson (1964) thrnkiumr.Z haunt's thnu'oLrgim t'unner'gc'nr'v actions other' hotrsc's mmci ln'an'tinrunal n'r'sc'u'vt' banking instilrnlinnmis thimrnr time susIs'flsicuui cii cash pamnneumt', Dint' apIn' ci'r'mutiung c'eu'tilic';utc's that r'~r'r'c'cic'ci thn'in' hnolciirtgs pi'ozrr'hu inn\ cui~c'ci lint' issrr,mnmc'r' cit r'lrzni'iuiglmnnrtsc' loan iii easin ('un litir'mnic,s, C lt'mLu'iulginonusl's~\r'r'u'c'tinnpur'mttir' iumsti ,, lniuli,til~'. t'lr'ni'nrmn4lnnntr,,r' n'i'n'tuluu'mrtc's t'ur't'cui;utr'ci ttrtmtinns cstmrhlnsint'ci hi~immimiks mci r'r'rinnmnunmn,'e nm tint tnumi~,runmnnnng tn,rnnks tlnmut \\eu'n' unnc'nnutnr'u's cii ilmc' n'h''ar' ri'srnrun'n'c's nusc'tl run r'ld'zlu'inir~c'lnc:c'ks mid nnnnlr's mrunnonniz innglimmnuse. I )ruu'uum,n.~p;nummc'~. r'it'muu'nnigIiurmsn' nrit'uniiuc'n's thic'nmmsmItc's C inn'm'ks mnrnci mold's chin 1 our other agreed Icr accept thr'',c' c'r'n'mdmc'.rtes ii I)mñnennt mcmii On'unninr'n l~nt n: ,nhtrr' nirt'iumnrI~c~u'~inrrIrrnncitr nnrc~11mm Si,ntrs linus riisrmn~c''~tmnmrmmm\'zrs ,issnur'u,nlr'ti~~ilin sum p u,.tn'nmrr'rnl, I inn', ,rm'inmnrn iicrc~ect'n, c~,rsiun',nrttir'itnmt tirlu 1 ns mm I s strmm'i~mmm'rt'r~nj \t,nu'n'im ,rmmrl \trgrrst 'un: str'nmr Ito' pummit' h)e 1 nrrsntcnn turns lnc~ranm uI rrtimr'r' insliicmtin' I 'u unmnnmmml\ \\r'nml runlnr m 'itt' ssrrnmr ,rttr'r \t,r~trnmnm', mr'ihr'm trmm,. t urnrr'r,nI hiss tnt rn iim'n'iurnr' inn rum1 rn imnmnnnmrnc' ,nr'ti~nlc\as thin' ',t,mhmntit\ ml mini' hnirikrnmr,~',~strnnn\\ rtiuiur mc Ir~ñi,I\s mcI,rIi~i'lĩmnc\ rrmniri tiui' inimmi~inntr m,mnnlr' inn tim' l;nii nt 1mm ,nII tir' 1 mrnsitmnm~Innslmtmmlrrmmn', nm 'cr'c~\mmni~C il\ t,mn'u'nĩ u',rn inn rri.rti~r'tm,t 1 nini turn lint' 'mum mir 1 nrnsrtnnr' m'rrrns, i,rnnks run~~i'c~\rmm'i~ir~surs 1 mrrrcimni m',nsin n;r~mmmr'mmtsinn \rn~r'rininu'n inn: ;rmnti tint surs;nn'mn,',imnnm lint' i',nmmmm'r,I inutn lnm'r.mrruc~rmimmnim' 1 nmn.-,iurmn nrnmnrnur tint ' nil u,u\mmni'unt', ,',jmru',nrt The Federal Reserve did not respond to these banking crises as the Bank of England had near'hy 70 year's befor'e. US. cornmem'eial banks canie under' liquidity pressures because of cash withdrawahs by depositors and outflows of gold from the United States. Yet, except for a few months in 1932, the Federal Reserve did not increase the monetary base hn response to these cash withdr'awals from banks, Moreover', commercial banks did not act cooperatively to suspend cash payments to depositors as they had in earlier banking crises.' 3 Consequently, the deposit liabilities of the banking system declined sharply.
Congress took various appm'oaches to dealing with the general collapse of the banking system mi the 1930s, The most significant legislation was the establishment of feden'al deposit insurance. There hiave been no general banking panics in the lJmted States since 1933.
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Recent experience indicates that han-ge nunibers of bank failures do not induce nationwide banking panics. A controversial issue, however', is whether' federal deposit insurance could be eliminated without undermining public confidence in the banking system. "This section is based largely on Friedman and Schwartz (1963) . "Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 311-12) argue that banks did not suspend cash payments because they thought the need to do so had been eliminated by the establishment of the Federal Reserve.
The Br'itisli solved the pr'obleni of banking panics mone than 100 years befbr'e they adopted a progranii of deposit insurance administered by the gover'nment." Sonie argue that it is time to ehinihnate feder'al deposit insun'ance in the United States.' 3 In thieir view, banking panics ar-c best prevented by a credible henden' of last resort, and they argue that the Feder'al Reserve has learned how to function as such. Feden'al deposit insurance gives depositomy institutions the incentive to assume gm'eater risk than if deposit insurance wer'e eliminated or' offer'ed by pnvate firms.
An opposing view is that federal deposit insun'ance is essential for preventing banking panics. Since feder'al deposit insurance has been in effect for over' 50 years, depositor's rely on it, n'ather than on their' assessment of the financial condition of their' banks. In this view, banks would be vulner'able to runs by depositor's as they had been prior' to 1933 if federal deposit insirt'-ance were cancelled. 4, 1985 , the lar'gest S&L insured by the ODGF incurred losses because of the failur'e of a gover'nment secumities dealer with whih tIme Ski, had lau'ge investments. I'biese losses exceeded thie capital of the S&.t. and the cit rue 'esen'es of the OUGI". Whien these events wcm'e pu hI icized, depositon's an other' ODGF'-insuu'ed S&.Ls began to withdraw tbieim' deposits. 'I 'heir' confidence in the safety of nlieir funds was chestr'oved whien the u'escn'ves of the ODGF were wiped omit ." Eleve.mi days later', thie governor' om'der'ed all of the S&,Ls ins cried hw I lie OIJ( H" closed. One of the conditions for r'eopemiinig was that "The British progmam of deposit insurance was introduced under the Banking Act of 1979. With few exceptions, all depository institutions are covemed and must contribute to an insurance fund, Coverage is 75 percent of each account, with a maximum compensation of £10,000 for each depositor. This program was introduced in response to the secondary banking crisis of the early 1970s. " Ely (1985) , England (1985) , O'Dmiscofl and Short (1984) , Short and O'Oriscoit (1983) , and Wells and Scruggs (1986) . "Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (1985) .
they obtain federal in1surance for their deposits.''
The loss of confidence in the ODCh"-imisum-ed institutions did not lead to a general loss of confidence in depository institutions, 'h'hen'e were no u-uris onfederal/v insum-ed banks or SkI~sin Ohio. Similar events tr'anspir'ed iii Mar'vland in May 1985. A private fund insured the deposits of 102 Maryland S&,Ls. Losses at the Ian'gest S&.L insum'ed by the private fund trigger-ed n-uris iv depositor's on the privately insured S&,Ls thr'oughout thie state. Once again, then'e were no runs on feder'ahly insured institutions. Thie Mar land state govem'nmiient m'equir'ed the privately insured S&J.s to obtain federal deposit insun'anice. In r'eaction to these developments mi Ohio and Marvlanid, several other states have required their' pr'ivatelv iiisur'c'd thir'ift institutions to ohitain federal deposit insum'atice coverage. The m'ate of bank failur-e in the tJmiited States is currently high relative to failure n'ates in most year's since Wom'ld War It. There have been riianv episodes in U.S. history when men-eased bank failures led to banking panics thiat disrupted the ohien'ation of the nat ion's banking sys terii.
To pn'event banking panics. it is essential that the public maintain confidence in the safety of their deposits even though some banks an'e failing. In the United Kingdom. public confidence in the stability of the banking systemii was established thr'ough the cornniitment of the Bank of England to act as the hemider of last m'eson't in financial crises. This policy was established in the bankimig panic of 1866, amid the U .1K. banking system has not expen'ienicecl a banking p~mniic since. 'l'hie basic feat uu'e of that polk involves a comni itnient to increase the monietan' base curr'enicv held by the pubhic plus batik n'eservesl when bank nuns occur'.
Policies in the United States reflect a different histormeal development. After vanous banking panics, the Federal hieserve was established in 1914 as the centn'al "The Federal Reserve attempted to stop the depositor runs by lending cash to the privately insured S&Ls. Federal Reserve employees from throughout the System were put on special assignment to accept the assets of these S&Ls as collateral for the cash loans. This response, however, did not stop the depositor runs. This indicates that, in a nation in which depositors have come to rely on deposit insurance to maintain their confidence in the safety of their funds, the central bank may not be able to maintain that confidence by lending cash to depository institutions when the protection of deposit insurance is suddenly eliminated.
batik with the r'esponsibility of acting as the lender' of last rc'som't if a bankimig panic occun'm'ed, The F'eder'ah Reserve failed in that m'esponsihihty in the ean-ly 1 930s, which resulted in a nationwide banking panic in the United States in 1933. Them-c have been tio banking panics in the t.Jnited States since thie federal gover'nment established deposit insum'ance in the 1930s. Runs by depositor's on pnvately mnstrred savimigs arid loan associations in Ohio and Maryland during 1985 provide sonic evidence that lèder'aI deposit insum'ance is an essential featun'e of the policies in pmevenitinig banking panics in the United States.
